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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS), 
Employer, 
-and-
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
On December 30, 1977, this Board issued a decision and order in the 
above-entitled matter, finding a sufficient showing of interest by the Public 
Employee Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF), in support of its petition for an election 
and ordering an election to be held (10 PERB 113018). The election was held 
on April 12, 1978. PEF received a majority of the votes cast and the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) has filed exceptions to the election. 
On May 18, 1978, during the course of the hearings now in progress on the ob-
jections, CSEA moved for the reopening of our decision of December 30, 1977 on 
the ground of newly discovered evidence which, it claims, establishes the 
fraudulent nature of the showing of interest. 
An election having been held, we find that the allegation of fraud 
is relevant to the question of whether that election represents a genuine 
expression of the free choice of the voters. This question, including the 
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BOARD DECISION ON 
MOTIONS 
CASE NO. C-1537 
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issuec of fraud, is properly before the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) on CSEA's objections to the election, whether or 
not explicitly stated in the objections. We do not pass upon the issue of 
fraud at this time and we deny the motion. Section 201.11 of our Rules pro-
vides for our review of representation proceedings upon their completion, 
including the Director's determination on objections to the conduct of an 
election. 
On May 28, 1978, CSEA submitted to us a second motion. It requests 
this Board to instruct the Director to investigate expeditiously, to the 
exclusion of the other objections, whether the showing of interest was fraud-
ulent. This motion is not validly addressed to us. It concerns the discre-
tion of the Director to determine the order of presentation of evidence before 
him. 
Dated, Albany, New York 
June 2, 1978 
/^ H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
4^C /fcfe* M - O 
I d a K l a u s , Member 
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NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD „ , , 
#2B-6/l/78 
In the Matter of the 
BOARD DECISION 
PLAINEDGE FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1380, : AND ORDER 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section : Case No. D-0148 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
On May 23, 1977, the Chief Legal Officer of the Plainedge 
Union Free School District filed a charge alleging "that the 
Plainedge Federation of Teachers, Local 1380 violated Civil 
Service Law §210.1 in that it had caused, instigated, encouraged, 
and condoned a strike against the District that consisted of the 
teachers' (1) refusal to participate at faculty meetings and 
other school activities in September and October, 1976, and 
(2) mass resignation from their extracurricular activities for 
40 days during November and December of that year. 
After a hearing, the hearing officer issued his decision 
finding that a strike had occurred and that the Plainedge 
Federation of Teachers had violated Civil Service Law §210.1 as 
alleged. He found no extreme provocation on the part of the 
employer and that the impact of the strike consisted of the fact 
that the students in. the School District were without extra-
curricular activities for a one-month period. 
Subsequent to the hearing officer's decision, the Plainedge 
Federation of Teachers submitted to this Board a letter which 
states that it and the Plainedge School District believe that 
a dues deduction suspension of two months would be "fair, equit-
able and in the interest of future harmonious relations between 
the parties." The employee organization concedes that its ac-
tivities during November and December, 1976 constituted a strike. 
On the basis of all of the circumstances disclosed on the 
record, including the unusual nature of the strike and its limit-
ed impact, we determine here that a penalty of a two-months loss 
of dues check-off privileges as proposed by both sides is a 
reasonable one. 
We find that the Plainedge Federation of Teachers, Local 
1380 violated Civil Service Law §210.1 in that it engaged in a 
strike as charged. 
WE ORDER that the dues and agency shop fee deduction 
privileges of the Plainedge Federation of Teachers, 
Local 1380 be suspended, commencing with the beginning 
of the 1978-1979 school year, so that no further dues 
or agency shop fees be deducted by the Plainedge 
Union Free School District on its behalf for a period 
of two months. Thereafter, no dues or agency shop 
fees shall be deducted on its behalf by the Plainedge 
Union Free School District until the Plainedge 
Federation of Teachers, Local 1380 affirms that it no 
longer asserts the right to strike against any 
government, as required by the provisions of Civil 
Service Law §210.3(g). 
DATED: Albany, New York 
June 1, 1978 
3SU. /C&, 
IDA KLAUS, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, 
-and-
Respondent, 
UNIFORMED FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
I.A.F.F., Local 107, 
Charging Party. 
#2C-6/ l /78 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2943 
The charge herein was filed by the Mount Vernon Uniformed 
Fire Fighters Association, Local 107, I.A.F.F. (Local 107) on 
October 21, 1977. It alleges that the City of Mount Vernon 
(City) violated Section 209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by refusing 
to negotiate in good faith over Local 107's demand to create a 
"Joint Safety Committee." In its answer, the City denies 
commission of an improper practice, asserting that the proposal 
in question concerns a non-mandatory subject of negotiations. 
Since the dispute involves a disagreement as to the scope of 
negotiations under the Taylor Law, it has been processed under 
Section 204.4 of our Rules of Procedure, which permits the direct 
submission of the dispute to this Board upon a stipulation and 
the briefs of the parties. 
The stipulation sets forth that on or about October 12, 1977, 
Local 107 presented the at-issue demand to the City. Said demand, 
which the City, by letter of October 13, contended was a non-
mandatory subject and thus refused to negotiate, read as follows: 
524D 
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10. JOINT SAFETY COMMITTEE: A general health and 
safety committee shall be created 
consisting of two (2) representatives 
appointed by the City and two (2) 
representatives appointed by the 
President of the UFFA. The Commit-
tees jurisdiction shall cover all 
matters of safety to the members of 
the Fire Department covered under 
this Collective Bargaining Agreement, 
including but not limited to the 
total number of employees reporting 
to a fire and the minimum amount of 
employees to be assigned to each 
piece of fire fighting -apparatus. 
The foregoing is intended to be 
illustrative and not inclusive. 
Decision of the Committee shall be 
made by majority vote, provided, 
however, that an equal amount of 
representatives appear at each 
Committee meeting, which shall be 
held at least quarterly or on 
special call of any two of the re-
presentatives. In the event of a 
deadlock between the Union and City 
Representatives, the issue in dispute 
shall be submitted to binding arbi-
tration. 
Local 107 places heavy reliance upon this Board's decision 
i n Cj
-ty of New Rochelle, 10 PERB 113078 (1977). Indeed, in that 
case we held that a union demand utilizing language virtually 
identical to that of the instant demand constituted a mandatory 
subject of negotiations. Aware of this decision, the City urges 
its reversal, contending that the thrust of the proposal in New 
Rochelle and herein concerns manning, and is unrelated to 
employee safety. More specifically, the City contends that 
safety aspects only attach after arrival at a fire, and that 
therefore, even if these concerns should properly be subject to 
the jurisdiction of a health and safety committee, the instant 
demand, which would also give the committee jurisdiction over 
"pre-arrival" matters, such as assignments to a rig and transpor-
tation to the fire, clearly usurps management' s rights regarding 
•3-
deployment of personnel. 
We decline the invitation to reverse our decision in New 
Rochelle. Recently, in Matter of City of New Rochelie v. 
Crowley, et al. , AD2d , 11 PERB 1[7002 (1978), the Appellate 
Division, Second Department, unanimously confirmed PERB's 
determination and in so doing cited with approval our prior 
1/ 2/ 
White Plains II— and Newburgh— decisions, as well as our sub-
._.. -. 3/ 
sequent decision in Troy.—' Such decisions, the Court held, 
evidenced that PERB had "... established an eminently reasonable 
balance between the conflicting considerations involved," 
precluding management from foreclosing negotiations over the 
creation of a committee to consider "individual and specific 
factual situations that encompass safety considerations," while 
barring a union from forcing management "to negotiate general 
questions of manpower under the guise of safety." The Court 
went on to hold that when viewed within this framework, the 
demand was mandatorily negotiable. 
While the Court's decision is clearly dispositive of the 
instant case, some comment should be made regarding the City's 
contention that "pre-arrival" situations are strictly manpower 
concerns. Admittedly, we held in. Newburgh that the predominant 
characteristic of rig manning is that of manpower and deployment, 
However, it was our dissatisfaction with the prospect of having 
to confront every specific factual situation dealing with rig 
- Matter of White Plains PBA, 9 PERB 113007 (1976) . 
~ I-A.F.F. of the City of Newburgh, Local 589, 10 PERB 1(3001 
(1977), aff'd 59 A.D.2d 342 (3d Dept., 1977). 
- Troy Uniformed•Firefighters Assn., Local 2304, T.A.F.F., 
10 PERB T3105 (1977). 
xJtC 
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manning that had prompted us in White Plains II to recommend the 
creation of a joint safety policy committee, with disputes 
therein to be subject to binding contract arbitration. As we 
stated in Troy, the necessity of determining the safety aspects 
of given rig manning demands in improper practice proceedings 
"would place an unwarranted burden upon 
the collective negotiations process because 
it would require, as a prior condition, 
that the negotiability ofeach manning/ 
safety demand be determined by us after 
an extended factual hearing as to the 
balance.between the two conflicting 
concerns." 
Thus, while the assignment of personnel per se and, arguendo, 
transportation to a fire, may be characterized as primarily 
matters of manpower, this is not to say that in individual fact 
situations, safety aspects may not predominate. 
Significantly, even if the parties or an interest arbitra-
tion panel were to adopt the instant demand in haec verba, 
neither the committee nor the contract arbitrator would thereby 
acquire carte blanche over manpower issues. We reiterate that 
"[i]t was not the intent of our New Rochelle decision to author-
ize the safety committee to set general minimum manning require-
ments for a rig under the guise of a purported safety claim." — 
As the Court in New Rochelle emphasized: 
Manpower questions may properly be considered 
by the committee, and by the arbitrator if 
they cannot agree, only within the framework 
of individual and specific factual situations. 
Neither it nor the arbitrator may consider 
general minimum manning requirements. The 
arbitrator, if called upon, may resolve dis-
putes involving a question of safety only in 
particularized and specific situations, (emphasis added) 
-' Id., at 3182-83. 
Therefore, any award rendered by a contract arbitrator concerning 
assignment of fire fighters per se, or their transportation to or 
from a fire would have to be based upon safety and not manpower 
factors, lest the arbitrator exceed his authority and subject 
his award to vacatur. 
ACCORDINGLY, we determine that Demand #10 of Local 107 is 
a mandatory subject of negotiation and 
WE ORDER the City to negotiate with Local 107 over this 
demand. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
June 1, 1978 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
9 cM&s &£#**, 
Ida Klaus, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, 
Employer, 
-and-
ROCKLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S PATROL ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
ROCKLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPUTIES ASSOCI-
ATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
/ /2D-6 /2 /78 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1507 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Rockland County 
Sheriff's Patrol Association, Petitioner herein, from a determination of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) that 
there should not be a separate unit for deputy sheriffs of Rockland County who 
work in the Patrol Division. At present, there is a negotiating unit con-
sisting of deputies in three of the four divisions of the Sheriff's Department 
1 2 
of Rockland County. The three divisions are Patrol, Civil and Court. There 
are approximately 36 deputy sheriffs in the Patrol Division, 8 in the Civil 
Division and 3 in the Court Division. The deputy sheriffs in the Patrol 
Division perform enforcement functions normally associated with the criminal 
J. They are represented by the Rockland County Sheriff's Deputies Association, 
Inc.. the Intervenor herein. It has taken no position regarding the 
appropriateness of the unit sought by Petitioner. 
2_ Deputy sheriffs in the fourth Division, the Jail Division, are in a separate 
unit which was created by the parties themselves, without objection from 
any outside organization. 
Board - C-1507 
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law enforcement responsibilities of a police force. They carry weapons. 
The deputy sheriffs in the Civil Division are primarily engaged in the service 
of processes in civil lawsuits. They do not wear uniforms and do not carry 
weapons, although they are authorized to do so. On occasion, they may make 
civil arrests. Deputy sheriffs in the Court Division maintain order in courts. 
They wear uniforms and, on occasion, they carry weapons. 
The Director determined that there is a community of interest among 
all the deputy sheriffs within the existing unit by reason of their comparable 
terms and conditions of employment and the centralized administration of the 
substantially similar personnel practices and policies relating to all in the 
present unit.: He rejected the Petitioner's argument that conflicts within the 
existing unit weaken the position of deputy sheriffs in the Patrol Division — 
for the reason that such deputies comprise over three-fourths of the employees 
in the negotiating unit and are, therefore, in a position to protect their 
interests. The Director also noted that the employer urged retention of the 
existing unit because its fragmentation would be administratively inconvenient. 
He cited our decision in City of Amsterdam, 10 PERB 1[3031, in which we relied 
in part upon the stated position of the employer that its administrative con-
venience in carrying out its mission would be better served there by a separate 
unit structure for the police force. 
In its exceptions, Petitioner argues that the Director's decision 
ignores evidence of conflicts of interest between the deputy sheriffs in the 
Patrol Division and deputy sheriffs in the Court and Civil Divisions. It fur-
ther argues that deputy sheriffs in the Patrol Division must have a separate 
unit because they are policemen, and policemen, should never be included in a 
unit with other employees. Finally, it contends that, as policemen in a 
separate unit, their negotiating disputes would be subject to interest arbitra-
tion, a procedure which could not be applicable to the other deputy sheriffs, 
Board - C-1507 -3 
and that this difference in the availability of impasse procedures compels a 
separate negotiating unit. 
We are not persuaded by the Petitioner's exceptions. We agree with 
the Director that the record does not disclose a conflict of interest between 
the deputy sheriffs in the Patrol Division and those in the Civil and Court 
Divisions. Neither do we find that the job duties of the deputy sheriffs in 
-the Patrol Division render them members of a police force and, hence, require ._ 
a separate negotiating unit for them. Like the employees in the other two 
divisions, they are, in fact, deputy sheriffs, exercising their particular 
patrol functions as deputy sheriffs. If the deputy sheriffs in the Patrol 
Division were covered by the interest arbitration provisions of the Taylor Law 
and the other deputy sheriffs were not, we might well find that the disparate 
impasse procedures compel a separate negotiating unit for the other groups. As 
a matter of law, however, deputy sheriffs in the Patrol Division are not 
2 
covered by the interest arbitration provision and, thus, this argument is 
irrelevant. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE AFFIRM the decision of the Director, and 
WE ORDER that the Petition herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
ALBANY: Albany, New York 
June 2, 1978 
yJfiou^tJ:/n\¥~e^<s-rtta^ S 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
.3*. &-
Ida Klaus, Member 
_3_ Interest arbitration is available to a "police force or police department 
of any county, city, except the city of New York, town, village...or police 
district...." This definition excludes deputy sheriffs (Matter of Erie 
County Sheriff and Erie County, 7 PERB 113057 [1974]). 
Kocro 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CARTHAGE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
CARTHAGE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 2542, 
Charging Party. 
//2E-6/2/78 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2902 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Carthage Teachers 
Association, Local 2542 (Association) to the decision of the hearing officer 
dismissing its charge that the Carthage Central School District (District) com-
mitted an improper practice in that it refused to compensate teachers for 
graduate credits that had been earned after the expiration of a prior contract 
and before the execution of a new one. At the hearing, the District argued 
that its conduct was authorized by the agreement between the parties. 
FACTS 
The prior contract had expired on June 30, 1977. On August 18, 1977, 
the parties agreed that a salary increase at a total cost of $290,000 would be 
paid over two years and they initialed their agreement. When the parties met 
on August 30 to allocate this sum of money, they found themselves at variance 
as to whether their agreement was intended to cover payment for new graduate 
credit hours that were earned during the hiatus between the contracts. 
The matter had not been discussed by the parties when the amount of 
the total sum for salary payments was considered and agreed upon. In the past, 
the District had paid for such new credit hours out of its own budget, and the 
Association believed that the District would continue to do so. The Associatioi 
argues that, absent any explicit agreement to the contrary, provisions of prior 
Board - U-2902 -2 
contracts and understandings must be deemed to be carried over into the new 
agreement. The District believed that its offer of $290,000 covered all salary 
items and it maintains that the Association should have understood that.the 
payments for the new graduate credits must come from that money. 
The hearing officer determined that, notwithstanding both parties' 
assumption that they reached an agreement on August 18, 1977, there had been a 
mutual misunderstanding regarding a material term of that agreement and, thus, 
there was no agreement at all. Accordingly, he rejected the allegation that 
the District unilaterally altered the terms and conditions of unit employees 
by failing to execute and implement an agreement previously reached. 
The hearing officer also rejected the Association's alternative argu-
ment that the District unilaterally altered terms and conditions of employment 
by failing to pay for the graduate hours even if there were no agreement to do 
so. The theory of this alternative basis of the charge is that prior terms and 
conditions of employment must be continued even after the expiration of an 
agreement so long as the parties are under an obligation to continue their 
negotiations for a successor agreement. Relying upon the Court of Appeals 
opinion in Rockland County BOCES v. PERB, 41 NY2d 753 (1977), which held that 
this duty was not applicable to increased payments such as increments, and 
upon a hearing officer's opinion in Averill Park Central School District, 
10 PERB 114560 (1977), which applied the Court of Appeals decision to payments 
for additional credit hours, the hearing officer dismissed this basis of the 
charge. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer dismissing the charge. 
We agree with the hearing officer that, absent an agreement, there would be no 
obligation to pay for new credit hours. The Association appears to concede 
this. In its brief on appeal, it argues that this case must be distinguished 
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from the Averill Park case because here there was a successor agreement which 
was ratified by the parties and which was implemented except for the disagree-
ment involving the source of the payment for new credit hours. Thus, it is 
clear that the Association places sole reliance upon the existence of an 
agreement on the allocation of the $290,000 sum. 
While the hearing officer may be correct in dismissing the charge on 
the basis of his conclusion that a mutual misunderstahdihg of a material term 
1 
of what the parties believed they had agreed upon resulted in no agreement, 
we need not reach that conclusion in sustaining his dismissal. In view of the 
charging party's basic position that an agreement was reached, the dispute 
which it seeks to have us decide would, in any event, be no more than one 
involving the interpretation and application of that alleged agreement. In 
its brief, the District correctly argues that such a dispute is not within the 
2 
jurisdiction of this Board. It must be resolved through the dispute resolu-
tion mechanism established by the parties in their contract, or, in the 
absence of such a mechanism, by a court action for breach of contract. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
June 2, 1978 
-^<*^t>4j?, JC> /^C^WJL^L^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
5^ /dU^._ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
1 Cf. Yonkers Federation of Teachers, 8 PERB 113020 (1975). 
_2 St. Lawrence County, 10 PERB 1(3058 (1977) and §205.5(d) of the Civil Service 
Law, as amended by Chapter 429 of the Laws of 1977. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
KESHEQUA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
KESHEQUA NON-TEACHING ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner. 
#26-6/1/78 
CASE NO. C-1560 
BOARD DECISION 
On October 17, 1977, the Keshequa Non-Teaching Association (petitioner) 
filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment 
Relations Board, a timely petition for certification as the exclusive negotiating 
representative of certain employees employed by the Keshequa Central School 
District. 
The parties executed a consent agreement which was approved by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation on April 25, 1978. 
The negotiating unit stipulated to therein was as follows: 
Included: All non-teaching staff. 
Excluded: Bus drivers, bus-driver mechanic, building principals, 
physicians, guidance counselor, business manager, district 
principal, central office secretaries, secretaries to the 
building principals, head custodians, cafeteria supervisors 
and transportation supervisors. 
Pursuant to the consent agreement, a secret ballot election was held 
on May 12, 1978. The results of this election indicate that the majority 
U£GO 
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of eligible voters in the stipulated unit who cast valid ballots do not 
desire to be represented for purposes of collective negotiations by the 
II 
petitioner. 
Therefore, it is ordered that the petition should be, and hereby is, 
dismissed. 
Dated: Albany-> N-Y-
This 1st day of June, 1978 
^cu~-z£<£ (fy^L^t* 
HAROLD R. NEWMAN, Chairman 
sfzi&s /CJ^sCMyjL^-
IDA KLAUS, Member 
1/ There were 13 ballots cast in favor of representation by the petitioner 
and 22 ballots against representation by the petitioner. 
